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FOREWORD 
During the past several years there has been considerable 
interest in the transportation of hazardous materials and much 
of this has focused on radioactive materials. Attention is 
usually attained by accidents and incidents and to a lesser 
extent by jurisdictional disagreements debated in the public 
arena. 
It is thus desirable, on a periodic and systematic basis, 
that the experience data base be examined and evaluated to 
determine what it contains in the way of useful information. 
This study was conducted by the Southern States Energy Board 
for the U.S. Department of Energy/Savannah River Operations, 
Spent Fuel Project Office, for this purpose. 
Efforts were divided into three parts which were 
coordinated by the principal investigators and staff of the 
Southern States Energy Board. Major emphasis was placed on 
those states and areas covered by the SSEB although other 
jurisdictions are discussed for specific reference purposes. 
This report is an account of the activities of Project 
3.0, "Emergency Response to Transportation Accidents 
Involving Radioactive Materials," which is an inherent part of 
the two-year study titled "Radioactive Material Transporta-
tion -- a Regional Program." 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report summarizes the efforts conducted for Project 3 
which concerned itself with Emergency Response to Transpor-
tation Accidents Involving Radioactive Materials. It is an 
inherent part of the broader two-year study, Transportation of 
Radioactive Materials, carried out by the Southern States 
Energy Board. 
The objectives of the Project are: 
1. Evaluate the scope and adequacy of the emergency 
response plans of states in the SSEB region as they pertain to 
accidents involving all classes of hazardous materials and 
particularly radioactive materials. 
2. Evaluate consistency of emergency response plans and 
provisions for cooperation should an incident involve more 
than one state. 
3. Recommend appropriate changes in the plans that can 
enhance their effectiveness in dealing with accidents. 
4. Evaluate state-federal relationships with respect to 
emergency response planning for radioactive materials trans-
portation accidents in southern states and recommend areas for 
enhancement and cooperation in the development of new or 
improved plans. 
Available information was identified, reviewed and evalu-
ated. This specifically included the collection of current 
emergency response plans from pertinent states, federal 
agencies, shippers, and carriers of radioactive materials. 
Personal contacts were made to clarify and/or supplement the 
information as warrented. 
Two workshops were held November 1980 and November 1981 as 
integral parts of this two-year effort. These workshops 
provided the opportunity to discuss specific areas of interest 
and to exchange information among those having varied back-
grounds and responsibilities. Input from these sessions was 
incorporated into the respective studies. 
The record indicates the transport of large numbers and 
quantities of radioactive materials on an annual basis in the 
U.S. with very infrequent accidents and incidents. Most of 
these do not result in release of radioactive materials or 
increased radiation exposures and thus do not pose a direct 
threat to public health and safety. 
Control is achieved largely by enforcement of regulatory 
requirements for appropriate packaging, labelling, handling, 
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and transporting of radioactive materials. These requirements 
are primarily those of the U.S. Department of Transportation 
with important contributions by several other federal 
agencies. 
When transport accidents and incidents occur, the potential 
for hazard is reduced even more by having emergency response 
capability available for rapid deployment according to plans 
designed for the purpose. The sixteen states in the Southern 
States Energy Board region have such plans and a reasonably 
good record of implementation when called upon to perform 
emergency response services. 
Planning and preparations for emergency response have been 
given considerable attention recently and this is reflected in 
the current status of state and other relevant emergency 
response plans as well as the degree of confidence in the 
ability to effectively respond in the event the emergency 
response service is needed. 
The Southern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan serves as a 
model for inter-state and inter-agency cooperation during 
emergencies involving radiation and radioactivity within the 
region served by the Southern States Energy Board. A similar 
but broader plan could serve the same purposes on a less 
provincial basis. 
Recommendations are made which would strengthen the state 
emergency response programs and increase their capabilities to 
promptly respond to transport accidents and incidents 
involving radioactive materials and to effectively control and 
mitigate adverse effects on public health and safety. Such 
efforts require contributions from state, federal, and local 
governmental agencies as well as from shippers and carriers. 
There are also very positive roles which should be played by 
groups such as the Southern States Energy Board in these 
efforts. 
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TRANSPORTATION 
ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Radiation and radioactive materials are used extensively 
throughout the United States in virtually every aspect of our 
society--industrial, agricultural, medical, cultural, mili-
tary, energy production, and research. Their use normally 
involves production or manufacture, distribution, application 
and disposal of unused products. 
Transportation connects this chain of production and 
application and may well involve a particular product a number 
of times. In the nuclear fuel cycle, raw materials are mined, 
transported to processing facilities in which various steps 
are performed sequentially at different sites, used in other 
locations; finally, the waste is sequestered at a waste man-
agement site. Highway, air, water, and rail modes of trans-
portation are used to connect this network or matrix in an 
effective manner. 
Another example is rapid transport, usually by air and 
highway, of radionuclides used in medical procedures from 
production plants to hospitals and clinics for application. 
For safety reasons, these are normally relatively short-lived 
materials that must be made promptly available for application 
at the place of use. 
There are also applications in which transportation is an 
inherent and indispensable part or provides the central theme. 
The former is exemplified by use of radiographic sources which 
are used in the field. Such sources are transported from job 
to job as the need arises. An example of the latter is nuclear 
power used to provide the energy for motion, as in a nuclear 
powered submarine. 
Thousands of individual transportation steps are at pre-
sent used to transport annually of the order of a million 
packages of radioactive material in the United States. It is 
expected that expanded uses for radioactive materials and 
radiation sources will call for additional transportation to 
provide this vital step. This is especially true with regard 
to the nuclear fuel cycle: increased numbers of widely 
separated commercial nuclear power plants and supporting 
facilities will require appropriate management of the radio-
active wastes generated at various places throughout the 
cycle. 
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In order for these systems to be operated effectively, it 
is necessary to assure health and safety and minimize environ-
mental effects. This applies at the place of use and at each 
stage of the transportation cycle. Effective and positive 
control must be maintained. Should this be interdicted, it is 
obligatory that emergency response capability be readily 
available for quickly rectifying the situation. 
A good general characterization of the ability to respond 
effectively to an emergency situation is literally applying to 
all conceivable circumstances the motto of the Boy Scouts: 
"Be prepared." This environment of preparedness requires 
foresight, dedication, resources, planning, and commitment. 
The results are tangible, real, and rewarding. Pasteur said, 
"chance favors the prepared." 
Effective emergency response consists of actions which 
prevent or minimize adverse effects and ramifications of an 
accident on a prompt basis, correct or control the situation 
which produced the emergency, protect persons and property, 
and mitigate detrimental sequences which may have been initi-
ated prior to application of the response actions. 
This study examines the transportation of radioactive 
materials, reviews the experience and potential for transpor-
tation accidents, evaluates the plans established to provide 
emergency response services, and makes recommendations to 
improve these. Emphasis is placed on planning responses to 
accidents involving transportation of radioactive materials 
and on developing the capability to respond effectively to 
emergencies. 
This Project--the third in a 3-part 	effort by the 
Southern States Energy Board (SSEB) -- has the following 
objectives: 
1. Evaluate the scope and adequacy of the emergency 
response plans of states in the SSEB region as they pertain to 
accidents involving all classes of hazardous materials and 
particularly radioactive materials. 
2. Evaluate consistency of emergency response plans and 
provisions for cooperation should an incident involve more 
than one state. 
3. Recommend appropriate changes in the plans that can 
enhance their effectiveness in dealing with accidents. 
4. Evaluate state-federal relationships with respect to 
emergency response planning for radioactive materials trans-
portation accidents in southern states and recommend areas for 
enhancement and cooperation in the development of new or 
improved plans. 
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Particular tasks to be undertaken by Project 3 include 
(SS80a): 
1. Collect and review the SSEB states' emergency re- 
sponse plans for hazardous materials transportation accidents 
to determine adequacy and status of plan development. 
2. Collect and review, on a selective basis, such docu-
ments as company manuals, driver training programs and quali-
fications standards, etc. from traditional transporters of 
radioactive 	materials 	to 	determine 	general 	industry 
capabilities in 	dealing with 	radioactive materials 
transporation accidents. 
3. Analyze SSEB states' emergency response plans pert-
aining to radioactive materials transportation accidents for 
consistency with federal regulations and similar plans of 
adjoining states. Determine the compatibility of the plans 
with established procedures within the transportation 
industry. 
4. Recommend relevant actions to be taken for improve-
ment of the emergency response plans. 
5. Confer with appropriate state and federal officials 
regarding implementation strategies for integrating state/in-
terstate/federal plans and procedures for dealing with radio-
active materials transportation accidents. 
6. Conduct workshops, to report to state and federal 
officials the findings of the study. Solicit the comments of 
workshop participants regarding integrated state/inter-
state/federal implementation strategies. 
7. Prepare a topical report on efforts, findings, and 
recommendations. 
Of the two other parts of the SSEB program, project one 
reviews and analyzes state and regional radioactive materials 
transportation plans in order to identify and resolve socio-
economic and institutional barriers. Its report, entitled 
"Identification of Socioeconomic and Institutional Barriers 
to Radioactive Materials Transportation," (SS81a) is 
available. Project 2 has the assignment to evaluate and 
develop regional methodologies for reporting and monitoring 
the transport of radioactive materials. The findings and 
recommendations of this effort are in a report by Nilsson and 
Hill (Ni82). 
The SSEB (formerly known as the Southern Interstate 
Nuclear Board) was established in 1961 under the authority of 
Public Law 87-563, the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact. 
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Its members are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. 
This Board has long had an interest and programs 
concerned with nuclear energy, including transportation of 
radioactive materials and emergency planning. Published 
reports of the SSEB in these areas of interest include "Radio-
active Materials Transportation" (SI73) and "The Southern 
Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan" (SE81). Additional infor-
mation concerning the SSEB is in its most recent annual report 
(SS81b). 
The three related studies are concerned with the geo-
graphical area served by the SSEB. In some cases, however, 
the frame of reference is much broader and may extend to other 
states as well as to foreign countries. Such concerns include 
experience in transporting used nuclear fuel elements and the 
rules and regulations for transport of radioactive materials, 
which in most countries are based on guidance by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 
2.0 TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 
2.1 Radioactive Materials  
Radioactive materials (RAM) are those substances which 
contain energetically unstable atoms. In the process of 
becoming stable, they emit radiation and thus demonstrate 
radioactivity. Alpha and beta particles and neutrons may be 
emitted as well as photons (gamma rays and x-rays). 
Many of the materials transported are of value due to 
q.ir radioactive nature. Examples are the gamma rays from 
Cs, the neutrons fro an americium-beryllium source, and 
the beta particles from -"H. 
OthsEs are used #.6?In generators of a useful product; for 
example No produces Tc. This latter radionuclide is used 
for human organ imaging techniques. Several million such 
examinations are performed annually in the United States. 
Another type of radioactive material which is transported 
ensiz.ly is fislAe material. 	This designation includes 
JJ U, 	J'Pu, and 	JJU used as fuels in nuclear reactors. 
Their characteristic use is in generating large amounts of 
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energy when fissioned by neutrons under approy to cq9F-
stances. In parallel, source materials such as U and Th 
are transported for their ability to be converted to fissile 
serials p.y. absorption of neutrons and subsequent decay to 
Pu and JJ U, respectively. 
There has been a reasonably steady increase in the 
production and use of radioactive materials and in the 
generation of by-products and waste materials. These 
activities are expected to continue growing during the fore-
seeable future. 
The major area of uncertainty is in the management of 
radioactive wastes and related transportation requirements. 
Commercial low-level wastes are at present being transported 
to shallow land burial sites in South Carolina, Nevada, and 
Washington. Criteria as to what wastes are acceptable and the 
quantities that could be received have been varied at these 
sites. Greater capacity will be needed in the near future 
because that of the current waste management facilities is 
finite and limited. 
Uncertainties regarding policies and procedures for the 
operation of these sites have helped produce the situation in 
which volumes of low-level waste are being generated and 
stored at the sites of generation until appropriate arrange-
ments can be made for their transport and disposal. 
Another major area of uncertainty involves the lack of a 
definitive policy in handling used fuel elements from 
commercial power reactors. For many years, the expectation 
was that these used fuels would be reprocessed to return the 
uranium and plutonium into the nuclear fuel cycle for their 
intrinsic energy value. The high-level waste would be dis-
posed of at a federal high-level radioactive waste repository. 
This general situation was changed drastically by Presidential 
declaration early in 1977. The stated policy forbade com-
mercial fuel reprocessing. It appeared that used fuel elements 
would be treated, at worst, as high-level radioactive waste 
or, at best, as a resource which someday might have value. 
They would be stored in some suitable fashion for an indefi-
nite period. 
These policies are under review and it is widely expected 
that they will be changed. They impact a great deal on trans-
portation. At present, used fuel elements are stored 
primarily at the commercial nuclear power plants that are the 
sites of generation. These have rapidly diminishing capacity 
to continue this practice. 
Changes in policy to allow and encourage fuel reprocess-
ing and high-level waste management would result in many 
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transportation steps. 	Used fuel elements -- 	the present 
backlog as well as those produced in the future -- would need 
to be transported to fuel reprocessing plants. The products 
from such plants, i.e. high-level radioactive waste, useful 
quantities of uranium and plutonium, and related wastes would 
require transport to appropriate locations within the closed 
nuclear fuel cycle. 
Radioactive materials can be categorized in a number of 
useful ways: by the source or method of production, the 
agency or group involved with their use, the regulatory frame-
work, and the functional use or application. By application 
or functional category (Ca82) the individual groups are radio-
pharmaceutical; radionuclides for industry, research or 
education; radiation sources for medicine (telethearpy) or 
industry (radiography); nuclear fuel cycle materials; and 
radioactive waste from all these uses. On occasions it will 
be desirable to impose a fine structure on certain of these 
categories as in discussing transport of high-level waste, 
low-level waste, and used fuel elements. 
Two other categories of specialized radioactive mate-
rials should be mentioned because they are transported, can be 
involved in accidents for which emergency response is appro-
priate, and are handled generally in a particular but circum-
scribed manner by designated groups (agencies). These are 
nuclear weapons and weapon components and shipments of certain 
nuclear materials which are owned, handled, and used by 
federal agencies. 
The first nuclear weapon was built, transported, and 
tested in 1945; such devices have been transported ever since. 
They are different from usual radioactive materials primarily 
with respect to criticality, association with high exposives, 
security, and safeguards. These differences impose the need 
for special requirements during any accident sequence, includ-
ing use of trained personnel. 
Certain special circumstances also may relate to the 
transport of selected nuclear materials which are owned, used, 
and transported by federal agencies. The usual and reasonable 
requirement is that all procedures be at least as stringent as 
those imposed by regulatory agencies on other groups who might 
transport similar materials. 
Radioactive materials (radionuclides) have been used 
extensively in medicine, industry, research, education, the 
nuclear fuel cycle, and agriculture. These uses were estab-
lished many years ago and have expanded rapidly as newer 
applications have been identified and developed. An overview 
presented here is taken primarily from the "Final Enviromental 
Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air 
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and Other Modes" by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(OS77a). This is a comprehensive report which presents a good 
summary of the transportation of radioactive materials. 
Nuclear medicine, which is the clinical application of 
radioactive materials, has become an important and major 
branch of medicine during the past several decades. The 
numbers of medical procedures performed annually as well as 
the numbers of curies of activity involved have been in the 
millions and are increasing. These procedures involve thou-
sands of clinics and hosuitals proughoitg8 the United States. 
Radionuclides, such as 9ymTc ' I, ' Au, and 3Hg, are 
used for imaging and scanning. 
In addition to diagnostic procedures, specific radio- 
nuclides are used as tinrapy souls. 	In general, these 
teletherapy sources. of 	Co and '''Cs are used to destroy 
localized malignancies. Such sources are usually solid in 
form, contain several thousand curies of the radiosotope, and 
last a number of years before requiring replacement by the 
manufacturer. 
Well-logging, radiography, gauging, and food irradiation 
are examples of industrial and/or research applications of 
radionuclides. Well-logging normally involves relatively 
irg411 neutron sources (such as americium-beryllium) and a 
''Cs source. These sources are transported and used in the 
field to identify underground geological properties. Radio-
isotopes are also used extensively to inject into wells of 
various sorts to determine flow characteristics. 
Radiography normally utilizes 192 1r to examine struct-
ural integrity. Such sources are in radiography cameras which 
can readily be transported and used in the field at multiple 
locations. They are usually about 100 curies in size when new 
and replaced when they have decayed to about 30 curies. Their 
use involves transport not only during their useful lives but 
also between the manufacturer and user. 
A large number of radioisotopes, in amounts ranging from 
millicuries to several curies, are used as gauges. Applica-
tions are for measuring material thickness, level, and 
density, coatingAickn2q andooistne conteq 41 Such sealed 
souses inclp4 "' Ra, ''Cs, Co, ' Sr, and Am. Sources 
of Co and ''Cs in quantities up to several hundred thousand 
curies are utilized in food irradiation for preservation and 
for other purposes. 
The nuclear fuel cycle involves all steps between mining 
uranium ores and ultimate disposal of associated wastes. The 
center piece of the cycle is the utilization of nuclear fuels 
in nuclear power plants for producing electricity. 
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Most nuclear source materials (uranium ores) are mined in 
certain western states, milled in nealA locations, refined 
into uranium hexafluoride, enriched in -"U content (about 2-
i4%), fabricated into fuel rods of U0 0 , used as an energy 
source in commercial nuclear power 61ants, and at present 
stored at the reactor (power plant) in water pools awaiting 
additional processing. This additional processing could in-
volve disposal as a waste material (used fuel elements) or, 
most likely, treatment in a fuel reprocessing plant which 
separates useful plutonium and uranium from the high-level 
radioactive waste. 
The plutonium and uranium would be recycled for use of 
their fuel values, i.e. the uranium into the enrichment pro-
cess whereas the plutonium would become a part of mixed oxide 
fuels for other reactors. The high-level waste would be pro-
cessed and transported to a federally owned high-level radio-
active waste repository. 
The nature of the nuclear activities of these materials 
and the manner in which they are handled and transported are 
changed drastically during the fission process which occurs in 
the reactor (nuclear power plant). Prior to that time, the 
radioactive materials represent a minimal radiological situ-
ation and one in which handling procedures and problems are 
fairly simple and straightforward. 
Fission in the nuclear power plant creates millions of 
curies of radioactivity and products which are extremely 
radioactive as well as thermally active. Their handling and 
transport now require massive shielding for protection and 
cooling systems for heat dissipation. 
Used fuel elements and high-level radioactive waste (when 
it becomes available from reprocessing plants), both contain 
millions of curies of radioactivity. They must be specially 
enclosed and packaged in designed, highly shielded casks for 
transport. 
Radioactive waste of various compositions is generated at 
all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and at various points in 
the processing and application of radioactive materials for 
useful purposes. Such wastes are defined in several manners 
but may include uranium mill tailings (high volume, low radio-
activity content), low-level waste, high-level waste, trans-
uranic waste (TRU), and combinations of certain categories. 
2.2 Transportation 
Large amounts of radioactive materials are transported in 
the United States. These quantities are measured in various 
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ways, i.e. in number of packages, total transportation index 
(TI), curies, weight, and volume. 
There is a large range in the quantities or amounts of 
radioactivity which are transported as a package or a ship-
ment. These amounts are usually measured in units of radio-
activity, i.e. curies (Ci) or becquerels (Bq). Fissile 
material is also characterized in terms of weight, e.g. grams 
or tons. Individual packages range from fractions of grams in 
weight to many tons and from a few Bq to millions of Ci. 
Radioactivity is transported in all physical forms--
solids, liquids, and gases. The form depends on the nature or 
use of the material. The majority of the RAM is undoubtedly 
solid. In certain cases, a very small weight of material in 
transit potentially can represent a much more hazardous situ-
ation than a shipment of other RAM containing many tons. 
The effective control of RAM is based in part on proper 
packaging and handling with due regard to the type of rad-
iation and the amounts (radioactivity content). This results 
in the use of a wide range of packages or containers which are 
selected for the job to be done. These range from inexpensive 
metal cans and cardboard boxes to multi-million dollar casks 
used to transport used fuel elements from reactors. The 
latter have elaborate and massive shielding as well as heat 
removal systems. The cans and cardboard boxes are expendable 
whereas the casks are used for many years. 
These drastic differences in the treatment and control of 
various radioactive materials, as appropriate in each indiv-
idual case, during their transport can result in a lack of 
understanding by the public that may conflict with emergency 
response by individuals in such efforts. They may also help 
contribute to a public perception that transport of 
radioactive materials is more hazardous than is demonstrated 
by a careful evaluation of the extensive experience which is 
available for review. 
Drum and Reinhold have compiled a 36-page selected 
bibliography of the literature available on the transportation 
of nuclear materials during the period January 1970 through 
December 1979 (Dr80). This compilation presents a broad 
overview of the literature, although emphasis is placed on 
references to materials on spent fuel and waste. Another 
extensive 	bibliography 	is 	contained 	in 	the 	report 
"Transportation of Radionuclides in Urban Environs: Draft 
Environmental Assessment" by Finley, et al. (F180). 	This 
bibliography is some 86 pages in length and contains well over 
1,200 references. 
A number of radioactive materials are shipped or trans-
ported many times during their useful existence and in some 
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cases the physical form and overall characteristics are 
changed in the sequence of use. An example of this type of 
sequence is uranium which is mined in Africa, shipped to the 
U.S. in the form of U 308 (yellowcake), scheduled for enrich- 
ment in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, then for shipment to France for 
fabrication into fuel elements which would be transported back 
to Africa for use in South Africa's first nuclear power sta-
tion which is under construction near Cape Town. This is the 
current plan and will occur if several difficulties can be 
overcome. 
The largest quantities of radioactive materials are ship-
ped as used fuel elements, wastes, and sealed sources for use 
in industrial and research applications. Used fuel elements 
currently are not shipped often but rather are stored at the 
commercial nuclear power plant of origin. This situation will 
change with the availability of reprocessing plants and/or one 
or more federal high-level waste repositories. Estimates 
regarding the generation of fuel elements, their processing, 
and the handling and disposal of the resulting high-level 
radioactive waste and other waste categories have been presen-
ted for a number of possible growth scenarios during the 
period from 1975 to 2000 (ON76). 
An available report (ON76) has a comprehensive analysis 
of the possible use of mixed oxide fuel in light water 
reactors on a widescale basis. It also presents possible con-
ditions of use. 
Records of the amounts (curies) and volumes of low-level 
radioactive waste sent to and processed by the three commer-
cial low-level burial sites have been summarized by Guilbeault 
(Gu80) for the year 1979. About 477,000 curies of radio-
activity contained in a volume of about 80,000 cubic meters 
were buried in 1979. The distribution of quantity and volume 
for the burial sites located at Bac SC, Beatty, NV, and 
Richland, WA is 31 1-6,942 Ci (63,443w"), 8,932 Ci (6,491m -"), and 
153,563 Ci (9,980m J ), respectively. Relative curie amounts of 
these wastes by source are commercial nuclear power plants 
(19.6%), institutional and industrial (69.0%), and govern- 
mental/military (11.4%). 	These numbers are calculated from 
data from Guilbeault (Gu80). 	It is noted that the largest 
fraction is calculated by difference. 
This reference (Gu80) also points out 	that, for the 
eighteen-year period beginning in 1962, the annual volume of 
low-level waste disposed of at commercial burial sites has 
increased steadily. Each state has some low-level waste 
generated within its boundaries and these waste volumes are 
identified and characterized on a state-by-state basis. Typ-
ical radionuclides are associated with the low-level waste 




59 Fe, 58 Co, 60 Co, 65 Zn, 134 Cs, 136 Cs 137 Cs, 140Ba, and 
Ce. 
Other projections of radioactive waste materials genera-
tion and their impact on the transportation system were 
addressed in a study conducted by Battelle for the Transporta-
tion Technology Center of Sandia Laboratories (Bat80). These 
projections of waste volumes, amounts, and other characteris-
tics for the period 1980-2000. They are presented for such 
categories as fuel fabrication, yellowcake conversion, spent 
fuel, low-level wastes from light water reactors, institu-
tional wastes, and defense waste. In all cases, increases are 
projected in wastes as measured by quantity, volume, weight, 
numbers of shipments,and numbers of transport trips. 
Several projections for generation of non-transuranic 
wastes from 1975 to 2000 are compared in the report "Environ-
mental Assessment for Barnwell Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Disposal Facility" (CN80a). The projections, by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Energy Research and Development 
Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in GESMO, 
and Chem-Nuclear Systems Staff, all show 2 to 3 orders of 
magnitude in increased waste volume, with large variability 
among estimates. The degree of variability increases with 
projection time. 
Sealed sources vary considerably in size depending upon 
application in medicine, radiography, research, or industrial 
Hes aInd7 as food serilization. Such sources typically employ 
Co, Cs, or lyztIr, which emit relatively high-energy gamma 
rays. 
Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories (0376a) conduct-
ed an extensive survey of radioactive materials shipments in 
the U.S. in 1975. Results from this survey are still in use. 
For example, the current literature refers to the presented 
estimate of number of radioactive materials transported 
annually in the U.S. of 2.5-million packages. 
In 1975, approximately 500-billion packages of all 
commodities were transported annually in the U.S. (OS77a). 
Some 100-million of these involve materials which are class-
ified as hazardous such as flammables, explosives, poisons, 
corrosives, and radioactive materials. According to Grella 
(Gr76), the RAM category of 2.5-million packages includes 
shipments made by an estimated 16,000 shippers. 
Recent results (Ca82) would indicate that perhaps the 
numbers of shipments may not have increased as dramatically as 
earlier predictions would have forecast. This finding could 
be tempered by the small population studied, or the exclusion 
of "limited quantity" packages; on the other hand, it could 
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reflect changes in the industry. There has certainly been a 
trend to use packages containing multiple sources of RAM and 
to consolidate packages for shipment. Such changes have been 
imposed primarily for economic reasons although they do repre-
sent technical modifications in the nature of the shipping 
industry. 
It should be obvious that the numbers of shipments are 
considerably less than the number of packages of RAM which are 
transported. This ratio is highly variable and depends upon a 
number of factors. However, both parameters impact planning 
for emergency response and should be borne in mind. 
In recent considerations by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission for evaluating the conditions under which governors 
will be notified in advance of shipments of certain 
radioactive materials through their state, it was estimated 
that approximately 389,000 shipments of nuclear waste will 
occur in 1985 and that about 24,000 of these will be in Type B 
packages (NR80). These containers are designed to withstand 
normal transport as well as specified types of accidents. In 
addition, advance notice would also be considered for several 
hundred shipments of used nuclear fuel in 1985. 
Radioactive materials are transported by a variety of 
transportation vehicles using the network or medium particular 
to those types of vehicles. Extremes range from exempt 
quantities of RAM sent through the mail to a shipment by rail 
or highway of a cask, weighing many tons, that contains 
hundreds of thousands of curies as an inherent part of used 
fuel elements. 
Most radioactive materials are transported by highway, 
rail, and air systems. In a number of cases, several modes of 
transport are involved in a given trip between points of 
origin and destination. 
Major factors in the determination of the type of trans-
portation system to use for a given package (shipment) of 
radioactive material are type and amount of radioactivity, 
shielding requirements (weight), physical half-life of mate-
rial (importance of time), needs for cooling, safeguards 
considerations, convenience, and cost. A brief discussion of 
these factors is given to assist in the understanding of the 
process by which the transportation mode is selected. 
The type of radioactivity refers to the kind of radiation 
emitted by the material being transported. The amounts of 
radioactivity (curies) and weight, or volumes of material will 
also help determine the selection of the transport mode. 
These are important considerations in determining the shield-
ing required, including the nature and weight of the shielding 
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material. Usually, the weight of the radioactive material is 
insignificant in comparison to the weight of its required 
shielding. 
Physical half-life determines the time period in which 
the radioactive material is useful. This factor, of course, 
is directly related to the amount (curies) of material. It 
also helps determine the need for speed in getting the sub-
stance to the place of application or use; e.g. short half-
lived radioisotopes used in medical and research applications 
are more apt to be transported by air. 
Casks with cooling systems are required when heat gener-
ated through radioactive decay requires continuous dissipa-
tion. This usually occurs in transporting used fuel elements 
and could be needed for certain high-level waste shipments. 
Safeguards considerations are a feature of the specific 
nature of the material and its potential uses and relates to 
physical protection (possession). It is one important aspect 
regarding selection of the transportation system. 
Routing has long been a point of contention between ship-
pers, carriers, and federal agencies on one hand and various 
state and local governments on the other. Some groups 
consider the present system to be effective and safe and that 
additional routing requirements are unnecessary. The counter 
argument has been that states and local agencies are more 
knowledgeable as to transportation conditions and thus in the 
best position to make value judgments. Moreover, these 
agencies need to know about transports so that such infor-
mation can be factored into emergency response plans. 
It now appears that a compromise has been reached with 
the agreement on publication of 10 CFR Part 73.37 and of 
NUREG-0725 (the first of a semiannual series) by the U.S. NRC 
(ON80a) and the proposed application of HM-164 by the U.S. 
DOT. NUREG-0725 provides information on routes approved by 
the NRC for shipment of irradiated fuel, reported safeguards-
significant incidents which have been reported and cumulative 
amounts of material shipped (ON80a). This report also pre-
sents the belief of the NRC that the design, construction, and 
use of special casks (as required by regulation) for transport 
of used fuels are adequate for public protection of health and 
safety; thus their utilization in a prescribed manner over 
rail and road systems designed for the appropriate weights is 
considered safe without specific approval of the route. 
Highway routing of transport of RAM has been given 
considerable attention by the Department of Transportation 
through its development of HM-164 titled "Highway Routing of 
Radioactive Materials." After a development period of about 
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six years, these regulations are scheduled to become effective 
in early 1982. Of particular interest are the aspects related 
to special restrictions for large quantity RAM. These include 
preferred routes, route plans, driver training and certifica-
tion, and exceptions for cargo security. A recent discussion 
of this development and its implications has been presented 
(A181). 
Prenotification of shipment of RAM has been, like 
routing, a source of disagreement among agencies and groups 
having responsibilities in this area. The prime concern has 
been the dividing line between types of shipment for which 
prenotification was and was not necessary or wanted. 
This issue has been resolved with the advent of recent 
policy decisions. These have resulted in changes in policy 
and procedures detailed in publications by the DOT (D081) and 
the NRC (ON80a), 
The NRC also recently announced its change in regulations 
to require licensees to notify states (governors or their 
designated representatives) in advance when shipments of spent 
nuclear fuel or potentially hazardous nuclear wastes will be 
transported through their state, (NR80). The change will 
cover all such spent fuel shipments and shipments of large 
quantities of nuclear waste, as determined by the NRC. 
The same public announcement, in the form of a news 
release (NR80), indicated that the NRC has affirmed in April 
of 1981 its confidence that its present regulations governing 
the transport of RAM are adequate with respect to safety. A 
large part of the basis for this affirmation are discussed and 
information contained in the "Final Environmental Statement on 
the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other 
Modes" (OS77a). 
A special feature involves handling, transport and 
storage of nuclear materials for weapons and weapon 
components. The DOE is responsible for design, testing, and 
manufacture of these devices to meet the requirements of the 
DOD. The DOD is then charged with the storage, deployment, 
and use, as required, of such weapons. 
This aspect of transportation, by law and by mutual 
agreement, is the joint responsibility of these two federal 
agencies, DOE and DOD. It is expected that their requirements 
for transport and related activities will be as stringent as 
they would be if such materials were being handled in the 
general system by the usual agencies. 
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2.3 Regulation  
One of the dichotomies in the transport of RAM which 
impacts especially emergency response is the fact that federal 
statutes assign primacy in most nuclear matters to federal 
agencies whereas responsibilities for health and safety are 
inherently assigned to the states, specifically to governors. 
These responsibilities sometimes tend to conflict and any real 
differences are apt to be exacerbated during situations which 
require emergency response from multiple sources, i.e. those 
of federal and state agencies. 
Regulation of radioactive material as to its transport is 
based on the fact that it is a commodity in the form of a 
hazardous substance. Thus, regulations are based on the types 
of radioactive materials, their quantities, and the forms 
(physical forms such as solids, powders, etc.), as well as 
special circumstances dealing with heat generation, potential 
criticality, and safeguards. 
Regulations are at the federal, state, and local levels. 
These regulations have been discussed and reviewed in several 
documents (0877a, Mi80, Bai80, Ba77 and SS81a). There has 
been considerable activity and interest in this area in the 
last several years, particularly at the state and local level. 
The SSEB report (SS8la) gives the current status for states in 
the SSEB area as well as local government regulatory activi-
ties and relates the regulations to their impacts on radio-
active materials transportation (i.e. their impacts as 
institutional barriers). 
NUREG/CR-1263, "Compilation of State Laws and Regu-
lations on Transportation of Radioactive Materials," (Bai80) 
describes in detail all pertinent state and local laws and 
regulations dealing with the transport of RAM through 1979. 
An especially useful part of this report is a 14-page table in 
the Appendix which summarizes the material in the report in a 
brief format. 
Barker (Ba77) has summarized regulatory and other 
responsibilities related to transportation accidents. He 
describes such responsibilities as they relate to federal 
agencies, states, carriers, shippers, and similar groups. 
Regulatory activities, responsibilities for preparation for 
transport and for emergencies in transport are covered. This 
author also defines accidents in reference to the four 
described phases of initial, confinement, cleanup, and cost 
recovery. 
A recent report (NE80) contains summaries of regulations 
from various countries dealing with transport of RAM. 	It 
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points out that national regulations have followed inter-
nationally established rules and standards. This is welcome 
on safety grounds and helps facilitate international trans-
port. It notes that RAM are different from other commodities 
due to their potential for contamination and characteristic 
radiation, heat production, and criticality. 
The international rules and standards referred to in the 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NE80) report are those of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (IA79, Ts79) which were 
first published in 1961 (IA61). These basic regulations are 
widely followed and deal with principles, control of 
radiation, containment of radioactive material, safe 
dissipation of heat, prevention of criticality, 
administrative requirements for carriage and storage, and the 
plan for further development. A recently published review of 
their development and status (Fa79) indicates that IAEA 
regulations undergo review and revision at about 10-year 
intervals, which means preparations for a 1983 review are now 
underway. 
2.4 Packaging and Handling 
The primary source of control for radioactive materials 
while transported and handled is packaging and confinement in 
containers selected for this purpose. There is considerable 
variation in the types, amounts, and forms of radioactive 
materials to be transported and a consequent variety in the 
kinds, sizes, and materials of construction, weights, and 
costs of containers and other types of packaging. 
Containers vary from those made of cardboard to very 
elaborate, heavy, lead and steel casks designed to transport 
millions of curies of radioactivity. The container for ship-
ping a particular quantity and type of radioactivity is 
selected based on experience. The type of container as to size 
and construction is based upon the job to be done. The 
simpler containers are used for exempt materials whereas the 
more sophisticated containers are used to transport used fuel 
elements from nuclear power plants, high-level radioactive 
waste, certain large amounts of other wastes, and very large 
special sources for use in medical therapy. Table 1 is a 
summary of RAM packaging. 
The basic purposes of the container are to confine the 
radioactive contents, prevent direct contact by people, and 
provide the shielding and geometry necessary to reduce ex-
ternal radiation exposures to acceptable levels at specified 
places which can be and are measured for compliance with regu-
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0.01 mCi (TGI) 
-25 Ci (TGVII) 
1 uCi/g (TGI) 
-0.3 mCi/g (TGIV) 
1 mCi (TGI) 
-25 Ci (TGVII) 
1 mCi (TGI) 
-1000 Ci (TGVII) 
20 Ci (TGI) 
-50,000 Ci (TGVII) 
NOTE: Based on 49CFR173.389-173.391; TG: Transport Group, see table in 
49CFR173.390. 
All containers used to transport radioactive material are 
expected to maintain their integrity during usual transport 
conditions and most accident situations. Type B containers 
are designed to withstand very severe accident stresses with-
out loss of integrity. The general containers are designated 
as Type A. Each type has to undergo rigorous test conditions 
which are specified in regulations. Basic regulations per-
taining to packaging of and containers for radioactive 
materials are in 10 CFR 71 and 49 CFR 127, 173 and 178. 
Packaging and containment are extremely important because they 
relate directly to the basic safety requirements for handling 
and transporting RAM. Safety requirements include adequate 
containment, adequate control of exposure, appropriate dis-
position of generated heat, and prevention of criticality. 
The rules and regulations of the NRC and the DOT are 
coordinated and in conformity in this area. Proposed changes 
first published in 1979 make the rules compatible with those 
of the IAEA (IA79). This aspect of transport with emphasis on 
waste materials has recently been reviewed (Bat80). Earlier 
reviews for transportation (including discussion of packaging 
and containers) of spent nuclear fuel and RAM have been 
published (8172, 8I73) by the Southern States Energy Board. 
Most containers used to transport radioactive materials 
are handled in the conventional manner using generally avail-
able procedures, by hand, with fork lifts, and other routine 
handling equipment. When large and heavy casks are used for 
high-level radioactivity, the only special equipment is 
related to the size and weight of the cask. 
Two types of situations require special considerations as 
to the packaging and handling of certain radioactive mate-
rials. The first pertains to special RAM which generate 
substantial amounts of heat and require heat removal systems. 
These materials are spent (used) fuel elements from nuclear 
power plants and high-level waste. 
The second special category is the material for which 
criticality conditions could occur. This situation would 
normally be anticipated when certain amounts (concentratpins) 
of fissile dr ipterials are transported. These include J 'U, 
ei5 U, and Pu. In these cases, special precautions are 
taken to preclude the concentration or accumulation of a 
"critical mass" of material during the handling and transport 
process. 
Packages and containers of RAM must be properly identi-
fied by labels and/or placards. The system of identification 
is based on the type and amount of radioactive material; is 
simple in practice; and provides easy visual recognition of 
RAM during its handling and transport. Table 2 contains a 
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Table 2 
Radioactive Material Labelling 
Label 	 Upper Exposure Rate Limit  
Exposure Rate, mrem/hr 	 TI* 
Yellow III 	 200 	 10 
Yellow II 	 50 	 1 
White I 	 0.5 	 - 
None** 	 0.5 
* TI: Transport index; the highest radiation dose rate at a 
distance 3 feet from accessible external surface of package 
(see 49CFR173.389). 
** For limited quantities of radioactive materials and radio-
active devices (see 49CFR173.391). 
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summary of radioactive material labelling whereas more detail 
on U.S. Department of Transportation hazardous materials 
labelling and placarding requirements can be found in 49 CFR 
Part 172. 
3.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
3.1 Emergencies  
Radioactive materials transport accidents and incidents 
in the U.S. for the ten-year period 1971 - 1980 total 85 
accidents in transit, 110 accidents during handling, and 464 
incidents, as shown in Table 3 (Mc80). Incidents are defined 
as radiological problems during transportation unrelated to 
accidents, such as surface contamination, leaks, or insuf-
ficient shielding. This information was compiled from data 
accumulated in the U.S. DOT Hazardous Material Incident Report 
(HMIR) system; reports from NRC files since 1976 have been 
added. The HMIR system collects all information that must be 
submitted by carriers in accord with 49 CFR 171.15. These 
reports are required in case of death, hospitalization, 
property damage in excess of $50,000, suspected radioactive 
contamination, or other situations that make reporting desir-
able, such as continued danger to life. 
The HMIR and NRC information indicates that radioactive 
materials transport accidents have been infrequent and of 
minor radiological impact during the immediate past. The 
reported accidents and incidents average 66 per year relative 
to the 0.56 million (Sm76) or 2.5 million (Gr76) RAM packages 
shipped annually in the U.S. Radioactive materials were 
released from only 64 packages in 10 years. All releases were 
from Type A packages, and most pertained to materials such as 
uranium ore, uranium dioxide, low specific activity sand, and 
short-lived radiopharmaceuticals. 
A list of the 11 accidents that involved Type B packages 
(Mc80) is reproduced in Table 4 to indicate the accident 
conditions in which larger amounts of radioactive materials 
were involved in the 10-year period. In none of these 
occurrences did the radioactive material leak from the 
container or radiation exposure levels increase. Two 
incidents involving Type B packages, however, were estimated 
to result in radiation exposures to humans. In 1971, high-
specific-activity Mo-99 solution leaked from its container in 
the cargo compartment of a passenger aircraft (Gr76) with 
possible doses below 0.3 rem to passengers (Ta76). In 1974, 
an incorrectly shielded Ir-192 radiography device being 
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Hazardous Material Incident Reports in 1971-1980* 
No. of 
No. of 	No. of Packages 	Package 	No. of 
Accidents in Accidents Failures Relcte 	
RAM transportation 	 85 	 711 	 41 	38 (5 events) 
Air 	 5 	 -- 1 	 (1 event) 
Rail 5 1 (1 event) 
Highway 	 75 	 39 (3 events) 
Type A 
Type B 
RAM handling** 	 110 
Air 	 1 
Rail 31 
Highway 	 72 
Other 6 
RAM incidents t 	 464 
Total hazardous 	 86,500 
material 
Reported by McClure and Emerson (Mc80) 
** Accidents associated with storage and loading/unloading 
t 	Not accidents; typically surface contamination report 
Table 4 
Radioactive Material Transportation Accidents 
Involving Type B Packages* 
	
Packages 	Date 	Mode 	Package Contents**  
6,000 lb cask 	4/71 	Rail 	UF6 
49,000 lb cask 	12/71 	Truck Spent Fuel 
32,000 lb cask 	6/72 	Truck 	UF6 
15,200 lb cask 	3/74 	Rail 	LSA 
217 lb cask 	6/74 	Truck 	Fissile 
38,000 lb cask 	8/74 	Truck 	Waste 
16,000 lb cask. 	8/75 	Truck 	U-235 1 U-238 1 Pu-239 
40,000 lb cask 	10/75 	Truck 	LSA 
• 	30,000 lb cask 	4/76 	Truck 	LSA/Waste 
28,000 lb cylinders 	3/77 	Rail 	UF6 










road and overturned 
Truck left road and 
overturned 
Derailment nearby 
burning NH00 3 
Vehicle struck in rear 
* Taken from Wingert et al. (TF81); no radioactive contamination resulted from any 
of these accidents 
** UF 6 = Uranium hexafluoride; LSA = Low specific activity 
returned by the user via passenger aircraft exposed both 
passengers and handlers, (Gr76), the latter to a dose as high 
as 130 rem (Ta76). 
Several other accidents have been reported. 	In 1970, 
just before the reporting program began, two trucks overturned 
in separate highway accidents, one carrying spent fuel in a 
Type B cask, the other carrying unirradiated uranium scrap 
(fissile material) (Gr76). 	No radioactive contamination or 
increased radiation levels were reported. 	Among 400,000 
packages shipped through London (Heathrow) airport by the 
Radiochemical Centre during 1975-1980, 89 packages were 
damaged, but none showed any loss of radioactivity (Lo80). 
Forty of these packages (all Type A), however, were in a 
passenger aircraft that crashed and burned upon arrival at 
Athens airport. They were severely damaged in the fire and 
released some radioactivity due to temperatures that exceeded 
640 °C, causing sealed aluminum cans to explode and melting 
the aluminum alloy in cans as well as the lead shields (Ha80). 
In 1974, one Type A package was loaded on an aircraft at the 
London airport after being crushed in handling and leaked Sr-
90 silicate colloid (Lo80). In Poland, approximately 100,000 
radioactive material packages were shipped in 1975, and 18 
accidents occurred from 1971 to 1975 (Dy76). Three cases 
resulted in radioactive contamination, but none had serious 
radiological consequences. 
Most damage to Type A packages was found to occur as a 
result of dropping relatively small packages from pallets, 
fork lifts, or carts beneath vehicles (Lo80, Gr76). The 
incidence of such damage was reduced at London airport by 
working with larger packages through overpacks and utilizing 
special carrying techniques such as cages instead of pallets 
(Lo80). Leakage of radioactive solutions from Type A packages 
is minimized because the vials are packed in material that 
absorbs the liquid, if vials break, within cans that usually 
remain sealed even when they are severely deformed and the 
outer package is breached (Lo80). The above-cited occasions 
of damage to vehicles without destroying the integrity of Type 
B packages demonstrate the resistance of these containers to 
ordinary traffic accident impacts. 
A number of accidents and incidents in the SSEB region 
provided radiological emergency response experience for state 
and local agency staffs. Among these were the incidents of 
leaking Mo-99 and unshielded Ir-192 on passenger planes to 
Houston and Atlanta, respectively; a handling incident in 1976 
at Knoxville airport, where Xe-133 gas leaked from a cracked 
vial so that it became unshielded although retained in the 
type A package (Pr80); a 1971 traffic accident in Tennessee 
that involved a truck with spent fuel; the 1977 derailment in 
North Carolina in which UF 6 cylinders were near burning 
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ammonium nitrate (see Table 2) (Va80, Ra79); and damage to a 
Co-60 teletherapy source without loss of structural integrity 
or increased radiation levels, on board a ship that unloaded 
in Savannah harbor (Be80). A report from Georgia described an 
overturned truck with LSA radioactive waste in sealed steel 
drums within a steel box on a flat-bed trailer container in 
August 1978 (Ca82, Ra79) and a flatbed car derailment that 
split open a piggy-back trailer and spilled some monazite 
(thorium mineral) from bags in February 1979 (Ca82). No 
contamination or elevated radiation levels resulted from the 
former, and only minor contamination, from the latter. 
Many efforts are under way to estimate the risk from 
radioactive materials transportation (Ta80, Tv80, Ma80). 
These usually divide the risk into two parts -- one from 
accident-free transportation and the other from accidents 
anticipated with regard to number and type on the basis of 
general assumptions or past experience. In the U.S., an 
accident severity scheme (from the least at level one to the 
most severe accident at level eight) has been applied to air, 
truck, and rail shipments with assigned probabilities and 
radionuclide release fractions and patterns. For an assumed 
total package shipment rate of 0.56 million per year and 
specified distributions among radionuclides, package types, 
and transportation modes in the U.S. for 1975 (Sm76), the 
population dose equivalent was computed to be 9,600 person-rem 
for accident-free shipments and an additional 4.5 person-rem 
from accidents. Approximately 90 percent of the computed 
population dose from accidents was attributed to plutonium, 10 
percent to radiopharmaceuticals, and less than one percent to 
spent fuel and radiography sources. 
A separate examination of the impact of shipments in 
urban evirons, however, suggests that if only five percent of 
the packages is transported through a large city such as New 
York, the annual risk will be 2.5 times the risk value derived 
above to the country as a whole (F180). The risk due to 
assumed accidents in transporting only spent fuel and radio-
active waste from nuclear power plants in the U.S. had earlier 
been estimated to be very small with regard to either 
contamination or exposure (RS72). Population doses were 
computed for the accident-free case, but were not given for 
accidents. 
To assist in considering the possible impact of trans-
portation accidents that involve radioactive materials, 
several scenarios have been postulated (A179). Dose rates are 
given as a function of distance from the scene of the 
accident. The report concluded that radiological effects will 
be small in most cases. 
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3.2 Responsibilities  
Planning for and responding to RAM transportation 
accidents has involved participation by local, state, and 
federal agencies, the shipper of the material, and the 
carrier. Local and state agencies generally are legally 
responsible for handling such accidents in the U.S. (Va80, 
TF81). Several designated federal agencies provide guidance 
for program planning in accord with 44 CFR 351 and support for 
incident response if requested. Competent response to 
incidents by carrier personnel and prompt response by the 
shipper to requests for information and logistical support 
concerning the involved material can assist greatly in dealing 
with such accidents or incidents. 
The basic planning document for responding to RAM trans-
portation accidents is the state Transportation Radiation 
Emergency Response Plan (TRERP). It assigns responsibilities 
among local and state officials and identifies the persons and 
organizations to be contacted in case of accident. In most 
states, the TRERP is part of the state -wide Radiological 
Emergency Response Plan or Emergency Operations Plan (M180). 
Preparation of these plans has been stimulated by NRC require-
ment of a Radiological Emergency Response Plan in support of 
nuclear power plants (Gr80) in states where such plants are 
located. A survey completed in mid-1980, however, found that 
13 states had no documentation for a TRERP (Mi80). 
Guidance for preparing state TRERPs came initially from 
the Western Interstate Nuclear Board (W175). Currently, a 
task force on transporation incidents under policy direction 
by the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating 
Committee is developing a guide, which is being circulated in 
draft form (TF81). 
Assignment of responsibility for handling RAM trans-
portation accidents depends crucially on the availability of 
professionals and trained staff with competence in radiation 
protection. The 1980 survey (Mi80) found in 26 states of 48 
responding that no jurisdictions within the state could 
exercise their own authority, i.e., the state government was 
responsible. Selected local jurisdictions -- usually large 
cities with adequate radiological response capabilities --
have authority to respond in five states, and all local 
jurisdictions have authority to respond in the remaining 17 
states. 
In the SSEB region of 16 states and Puerto Rico, 13 state 
governments currently participate in the Southeastern Mutual 
Radiation Assistance Plan (SMRAP) (SE81). 	The plan was 
developed by the Southern Emergency Response Council. 	It 
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provides for information exchange among the states and 
assistance upon request. 	Information exchange concerns the 
following 	important aspects of radiological emergency 
response: 




transportation public relations 
laboratories 	civil defense 
	protective action guides 
Ten federal Interagency Regional Advisory Committees and 
one Headquarters Advisory Committee are available to assist 
states in preparing Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 
exchanging information concerning federal, state, and local 
capabilities for emergency response within regions (Va80). 
Federal agencies such as FEMA, DOE, NRC, EPA, and DOT are 
members of these committees. 
The Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP) 
provides the mechanism for assisting in radiological 
emergencies upon request by state and local agencies (Va80). 
Primary means of support are trained radiological emergency 
response teams that can be dispatched on brief notice from 
numerous federal installations. In the SSEB region, such 
teams are available at Aiken, SC (SR81), Oak Ridge, TN (DE79) 
Upton, NY (ED75), and Albuquerque, NM (ED75a, ED76, ED76a), 
from the DOE; at Muscle Shoals, AL from TVA; at Montgomery, 
AL from EPA; and at Atlanta, GA from NRC (SE81). 
Recommended activities by shippers and carriers in 
response to RAM highway transportation accidents are presented 
in an ANSI standard now in draft form (AN80). The draft 
standard specifies the carrier's driver, dispatcher, and 
management responsibilities for planning, training, promptly 
notifying the emergency response agency and taking accident 
control measures. Emergency response preparation and 
assistance measures by the shipper are also presented. The 
carrier has legal responsibility for reporting accidents and 
incidents to DOT, but this responsibility is distinct from 
initiating accident control by notifying the emergency 
response agency. 
3.3 Preparedness  
Response to RAM transportation accidents is organized 
state by state on the basis of its TRERP. Federal guidance 
for preparing and evaluating a TRERP is now in draft form 
(TF81), and further guidance may be obtained in reports from 
the IAEA (Be80, IA81), Britain (B180), and Canada (Mc77). 
Major planning items for states based on these guides are (1) 
coordination among the various agencies participating in 
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emergency response; (2) designation of lead agency and on-
scene coordinator; (3) training and field tests of responding 
staff in radiological protection and emergency response; (fl) 
availability of equipment; (5) means of transportation and 
communication for prompt response; (6) arrangements for 
support in health physics, medicine, and emergency control; 
and (7) provision for giving accurate information to the 
governor's office and news media. Prior preparations concern-
ing all of the above items are especially important because 
most states have limited resources in trained staff and 
appropriate equipment. 
The state agencies participating in response to RAM 
transportation accidents usually include those responsible 
for public health, radiation control, emergency management 
(e.g., civil defense), public safety, and environmental 
protection. One or the other among these is usually the lead 
agency for radiological emergency response (Mi80). In 
response to the 1980 questionnaire, 33 states and Puerto Rico 
reported that they pre-designate on-scene coordinators, and 
the remainder have less formal arrangements, are in the 
process of developing arrangements, or have no such designa- 
tion (M180). 
Ongoing training programs are needed because most person-
nel participating in emergency response -- notably those from 
law enforcement agencies and fire departments who are 
generally first on the scene -- with active roles to play have 
no professional background in radiation protection. 
Conversely, radiation protection specialists often are not 
experienced in dealing with radioactive sources in the context 
of other hazards, such as fire, explosion, corrosive liquids, 
or poisonous gses, and with caring for injured persons or 
controlling crowds. Workers who handle RAM shipments and 
medical staffs that may assist accident victims also need 
training for responding promptly and effectively in radiolog-
ical emergencies. 
Only realistic field exercises can test the effectiveness 
of planning and training (Va80). Large-scale tests are 
particularly important to assure that personnel from different 
agencies and with different professional backgrounds and 
levels of training are cooperating according to plan. 
Short courses on RAM accident response are presented by 
several federal agencies (Va80, TF81) and other organizations 
(Th80), and applicable training material has been distributed 
(Ra79). In response to the 1980 questionnaire, most states 
indicated ongoing training for its personnel, notably through 
radiological emergency response operation (RERO) and radio-
logical defense (RADEF) programs (Mi80). Drills to test 
response capability have been performed in many, but not all 
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states. 	Some rely on responses to actual incidents to test 
their effectiveness. 	The survey report concluded, however, 
that frequent misuse or lack of proper maintenance of 
radiation detection instruments by first responders indicates 
a deficiency in training, and that officials complained of 
inconvenient scheduling and long waiting times for courses 
(Mi80). A major problem in maintaining the desired level of 
trained staffs in responding organizations is personnel 
turnover. 
FEMA and other federal agencies preceding it have 
supplied the states with many radiological survey instruments 
(SE81). Responses to the questionnaire indicate that simple 
survey instruments are widely distributed within states 
(M180). The more complex and specialized the instruments, 
however, the fewer are available and the less widely distrib-
uted they are. A few states report that they lack some survey 
instruments and associated monitoring equipment, including 
entire emergency response kits. Instances of inadequate 
maintenance were cited, as mentioned above. 
Means of transporting responding staff to the scene of 
the accident and of communication networks to support accident 
response were reported to be available to all state agencies 
that answered the questionnaire (Mi80). Transport included 
aircraft, boats, and specialized vehicles in addition to cars. 
Vehicles may be provided by the participating agencies, motor 
pools or support agencies. Some agencies have designated 
emergency vehicles, including specially furnished radiation 
emergency response vans. The available communication system 
in most instances is the state police radio. A mobile 
emergency communications vehicle is available in many, but not 
all, states. 
In serious accidents, state or local officials may need 
professional assistance by more radiological physicists than 
are employed in their agencies, and cooperation by staffs at 
medical facilities to treat injured persons that may be con-
taminated with radioactivity. Support by other states and the 
federal government can be obtained as indicated in the 
preceding section. Response agencies in most states maintain 
rosters of radiological health specialists in universities, 
industry, or government to call upon for assistance as needed 
(M180). A majority of states identify hospitals that are 
prepared to receive contaminated patients, but in some states 
this arrangement is informal and in other states no infor-
mation is available. 
The state executive and the public must be informed of 
the extent of the accident to take appropriate protective 
actions in the event of a hazard, be reassured in the absence 
of hazard, and in all cases to support accident responses and 
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prevent interferences. 	Guidance on this topic emphasizes 
factual reporting, clear communication, defined lines of 
responsibility, selection of a single spokesperson to the 
media with competence in the topic under discussion or a close 
advisor with this competence, and rumor control (TF81, Wa80). 
The responsible officials are usually faced with demands for 
prompt evaluation of the accident situation on the basis of 
incomplete information; relatively widespread fear of radio-
activity hazards when an accident is reported but no details 
are available; and with pressure on or temptation of various 
participants to provide partial information that may be highly 
misleading. 
3.4 Response  
Handling of RAM transportation accidents has been divided 
into three phases -- initial, evaluation, and cleanup -- for 
purposes of planning (IA81). The general preparedness needs 
considered in the preceding section pertain to all three 
phases, but a number of guides indicate the different 
approaches required during the three phases (TF81, Gu81, IA81, 
Be80). 
The main burden in the initial phase is on the carrier 
employee -- e.g., the driver -- and the first official 
responder -- usually a law enforcement officer or firefighter 
-- to render first aid to the injured, prevent the situation 
from becoming worse both radiologically and with regard to 
other hazards, and to notify radiological and other needed 
emergency response staff. The DOT has published a hazardous 
materials emergency guidebook for placing in emergency 
response vehicles to assist in the initial phase (D080). The 
guide shown in Table 5 is typical of guides No. 61 - 66 which 
pertain to radioactive materials. The same prupose is served 
by guides prepared by state agencies, such as the one in Table 
6 distributed by the Georgia Environmental Radiation Program; 
this guide also has separate one-page instructions for law 
enforcement officers and for firefighters. The ANSI standard 
for emergency response procedure involving truckload 
quantities of RAM includes detailed guidance for the driver 
(AN80). It recommends actions necessary to control the 
accident situation, advise others on the scene, notify local 
authorities, and contact the dispatcher. The conclusions 
reached by the first persons on the scene may determine the 
magnitude of the next phase, which can range from involvement 
by one radiation protection professional to massive response 
by numerous agencies. 
In the evaluation phase, the on-scene coordinator, 
assisted by specialists, must definitely determine the 
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Table 5 
Potential Hazards Guide 63* 
HEALTH HAZARDS  
Radioactive Material -- Degree of hazard will vary 
greatly depending on radioactive material. 
External radiation from unshielded radioactive material. 
Internal radiation from inhalation, ingestion or skin 
absorption. 
Runoff from fire control or dilution water may cause 
pollution. 
FIRE OR EXPLOSION  
Some of these materials may burn but do not ignite 
readily. 
EMERGENCY ACTION 
Keep unnecessary people at least 150 feet upwind; greater 
distances may be necessary if advised by Radiation Authority. 
Isolate hazard area and deny entry. 
Enter spill area only to save life; limit entry to 
shortest possible time. 
Wear positive pressure breathing apparatus and full 
protective clothing. 
Detain persons and equipment exposed to radioactivity 
until instruction or arrival of Radiation Authority. 
Delay clean-up until arrival or instruction of qualified 
Radiation Authority. 
FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE CALL CHEMTREC (800)424-9300. 
Also, in case of water pollution, call local authorities. 
FIRE  
Do not move damaged containers; move undamaged containers 
out of fire zone. 
SMALL FIRES: Dry chemical, CO 2 , water spray or foam. 
LARGE FIRES: Water spray or fog (flooding amounts). 
For massive fire in cargo area, use unmanned hose holder 
or monitor nozzles. 
Fight fire from maximum distance. 
SPILL OR LEAK  
Do not touch damaged containers or s•illed material. 
Damage to outer container may not affect primary inner 
container. 
Small Liquid Spills: Take up with sand, earth or other 
noncombustible absorbent material. 
Large Spills: 	Dike far ahead of spill for later 
disposal. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
FIRST AID  
Call emergency medical care. 
If not affecting injury, remove and isolate clothing and 
shoes; wrap victim in blanket before transporting. 
If not injured, remove and isolate contaminated clothing 
and shoes; shower victim with soap and water. 
Except for the injured, detain persons and equipment 
exposed to radioactivity until instruction or arrival of 
Radiation Authority. 
Advise medical care personnel that injured persons may be 
contaminated by radioactivity. 




General Guidance for Immediate Actions in the 
Event of a Radiation Incident by the First 
Individuals on the Scene* 
1. Keep all persons as far away as possible from the 
incident scene. 
2. Perform any life saving rescue and first aid necessary. 
3. If there is a fire or danger of fire, summon assistance 
from the nearest fire department. 
Li . 	Keep upwind of the incident, especially when fire is 
present. 
5. Notify the Georgia Environmental Protection Division as 
soon as possible (24-hour number--(404)656-4300). 
Provide information outlined on the Information Record-
ing Form. 
6. Avoid contact with radioactive materials and suspected 
contaminated mat3rial. 
7. Detain all persons involved with the incident or 
potentially contaminated by the incident, except injured 
individuals, at the scene until the Radiological 
Emergency Response Team arrives. 
8. Record names, addresses, destinations, and phone numbers 
of any persons who cannot be persuaded to stay at the 
incident scene. 
9. Eating, drinking, and smoking in the incident area shall 
be prohibited. 
10. Remain calm and wait for the arrival of the Radiological 
Emergency Response Team. 
* Taken from Radiation Emergency Information (ER80). 
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magnitude of the accident and initiate suitable protective 
measures. The extend of the radiological problem is 
determined from information concerning the RAM in shipping 
papers, on labels, from the shipper, from observing the 
condition of the package, and by monitoring for radiation 
exposure rate and radionuclide contamination. 
The following broad categories may be encountered: 
1. False alarm. A radiation problem is wrongly inferred 
from observations such as wet surfaces on a package (Pr80), 
erroneous reading (or interpretation of reading) with a 
radiation detector (Lo80), or open packages falsely labelled 
as containing radioactive materials. 
2. Damaged RAM package but no release of radioactive 
material or elevation of radiation dose rate. An incident or 
accident occurs but there is no radiation problem. 
3. Limited radiological problem. Some escape of radio-
nuclide from container and/or some elevation in radiation 
exposure rate occurs, but there is no significant hazard to 
persons or need for restricting access to large areas. 
4. Serious radiological problem. Persons are signifi-
cantly exposed to radiation or the situation holds the 
potential for such exposure. 
These categories are compounded by nonradiological 
problems resulting from the accident and by the presence of 
other hazardous material. 
If there is no radiological problem (categories 1 or 2), 
then the response moves to the cleanup phase for both the 
radioactive material package and any associated accident 
debris. If a problem exists (categories 3 or 4), the 
response could range from minor area restriction and continued 
surveillance to invoking extensive support in personnel and 
equipment, restricting large areas, and maintaining numerous 
contaminated or exposed persons under care, control or 
observation. 
When serious exposures exist, guidance is needed to 
determine acceptable exposure and contamination levels for 
protective action and for decontamination to return persons, 
areas, and materials to normal activities. The EPA has under-
taken the task of recommending such levels, and has published 
draft protective action guides (PAGs) for whole body exposure 
to airborne radioactive materials and for exposure of the 
thyroid to inhaled radioiodine (OR80). 
In the cleanup phase, the RAM is sent on its way if there 
was no problem, returned to the shipper (repacked if the 
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package was damaged), if no leakage occurred, or disposed of 
in accord with regulations if the radioactive materials leaked 
from the container. Materials made radioactive must also be 
disposed of or decontaminated to the extent considered 
acceptable. Persons, areas, and materials must be monitored 
to assure absence of excess radioactivity. The situation must 
be reported and documented in sufficient detail to define 
elevated radiation doses to exposed persons and assure the 
absence of exposure when none occurred. 
4.0 THE SSEB REGION 
4.1 State Response Plans  
All sixteen states in the SSEB region (but not Puerto 
Rico, which is included in the region) have developed 
systematic response plans for radiological emergencies, 
emergency operations, or disasters, as shown in Table 7. 
These plans have been prepared very recently, and many are 
still under development. In most states the TRERP is part of 
the overall plan but is addressed in a separate chapter, 
annex, or appendix. 
With the exception of Mississippi's, these plans have 
been made available by the state agency and placed in the SSEB 
library. The Mississippi plan is being prepared, and approxi-
mately one-half of the completed plans are under revision to 
the extent that the available document will have to be 
replaced. The survey presented in Table 7 and Appendix A is 
based on the plans available to this study in the SSEB 
library, and on telephone inquiries addressed to state 
officials associated with plan preparation and execution. 
Responsibilities for the overall emergency response plan 
vary greatly among states with regard to both lead agency and 
participating agencies. This would be expected because of the 
widely different ways in which state governments are 
organized. Moreover, the concept of a separate agency 
responsible for disaster control has been followed at the 
federal level only recently with the organization of FEMA. 
States have just begun matching this organizational pattern. 
State radiological protection officials usually are 
responsible for radiological emergencies at fixed facilities 
and during transportation because of the specialized 
competence needed in dealing with resulting problems. These 
officials are assigned to various agencies in the several 
states, notably those concerned with public health and 
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Table 7 
Transportation Radiation Emergency Response Plan (TRERP) in SSEB Region 
State  
ALABAMA 
Name and Date 
of Most Recent 
Emergency Plan 	Availability 	TRERP 






Official in Charge 
of Updating Plan  
Dept. of Public 
Health, Radiological 
Health Div. 
Aubrey V. Godwin, 
Director, Div. of 
Radiological Health 
ARKANSAS 	Emergency 	SSEB Library. 	Radiolo- 
Operations Current plan gical 
Plan, 12/79 	is under 	Incident 
revision. Response 
Annex Q 
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E.F. Wilson, 
















GEORGIA 	Radiological 	SSEB Library 
Emergency 
Plan, 12/79 
Included 	Dept. of Health & 
in REPO Rehab. Services, 
Dept. of Community 
Affairs, Disaster 
Preparedness Div. 



















Hazardous Dept. of Military 
	
Donald R. Hughes, 
Disaster Materials, Affairs, Div. of Manager, Radiation 
Plan, 4/80 
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Dept. of Emergency 
Management and 
Civil Defense 
Robert E. Corcoran, 




















State Board of 
Health, Div. of 
Radiological Health 
Eddie S. Fuente, 















Kenneth W. Miller, 
Administrator, Bureau 
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OKLAHOMA 	Natural Disas- 
ter Plan - 
Health Annex, 
1976 
Table 7 	(cont'd) 
Responsible Agency Official 	in Charge 
Availability TRERP for TRERP of Updating Plan 
SSEB Library Included 
in HMERP 
Dept. of Crime 
Control 	and Public 
Dayne H. Brown, 
Chief, Radiation 
Safety, Div. 	of Protection Section 
Emergency Management 
SSEB Library Not included 
in NDP. 	It 
Dept. of Health, 
Office of Occu- 
Dale McHard, 
Chief, 	Occupational 
is 4 page pational 	and & Radiological 	Health 
internal Radiol. 	Health Service 











SSEB Library Included 
in ORERP, 
2/82 
Dept. of Health and 	Heyward G. Shealy, 
Environmental Control, Chief, Bureau of 








to Annex II-i) 
is void. New 
plan not yet 
received. 
Emergency 	Dept. of Public 
Procedures Health, Div. of 
for Radio]. 	Radiological 





dix II to 
Annex II-i 
J.A. Bill Graham, 
Director, Division 
of Radiological Health 
Table 7 (cont'd) 
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SSEB Library. 
This plan is 
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Emergency Response and 
Investigation Branch, 
Division of Compliance 
and Inspection, Bureau 






Plan Annex I-V 
to Vol. II, 4/81 
SSEB Library Appendix 14, 	Office of Emergency 
Transportation and Energy Services, 
Accidents 	Disaster Preparedness 
Branch 
Ernest S. King, 
Chief, Planning Division, 











General plan, Office of Emergency 
does not spec- Services, Dept. of 
ifically ad- 	Health, Industrial 
dress tran- Hygiene Div. 
portation 
accidents 
William H. Aaroe, 
Director, Industrial 
Hygiene Division 
environmental protection. 	Officials from disaster response 
agencies are formally involved in some of the plans. From a 
practical point of view, their participation is important when 
the transportation radiological emergency is serious --
category (4) in Section 3.4 -- or other hazards are involved. 
When the radiological problem is minor or does not exist, 
response by a professional in radiological protection is 
usually all that is appropriate and necessary. 
Some of the relatively recently prepared radiological 
emergency response plans -- notably the Georgia plan -- are 
models of detailed information. They designate responsibili-
ties, present protection action guides, consider probable 
scenarios and appropriate responses, and specify a wide range 
of support actions and activities leading to a return to 
normalcy. On the other hand, several of the plans are 
organized so confusingly that it is difficult to visualize 
their being used in an emergency, and others have much 
ancillary information but little guidance for radiological 
emergencies. The latter are generally those under extensive 
revision. 
Some of the items of information identified in the 
Introduction are summarized in Appendix A for each state plan 
to indicate what is available and where further information is 
desirable. Information concerning regulations, agency 
responsibilities, communications, and public information 
procedures (items 1, 2, 4 and 5) are generally presented in 
the plans. The only broadly operative interstate agreement 
(item 6) is the Southern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan, 
although Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland are states that 
do not participate. Maryland reports an interstate agreement 
with the District of Columbia and discussions of other 
agreements in progress. Several other states make provisions 
for notifying contiguous states as appropriate. 
Lists of qualified individuals that could provide 
radiological competence (item 3) are presented in only a few 
plans. When available, the lists do not all indicate the 
specific competence nor the telephone number for reaching the 
individual. It was noted that even in the best plans, many of 
the names and telephone numbers of staff, agencies, and 
supporting specialists were outdated due to changes in 
responsibilities, locations, or telephone numbers. 
Relatively little specific information was available in 
most plans concerning training activities and manuals (items 7 
and 8). Availability of training courses and training 
materials sponsored by DOT, DOE, and NRC have been cited in 
Section 3.3 (Va80, TF81, Ra79). 
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4.2 Carrier Response  Plans 
Carriers are responsible for radioactive materials 
during the time they are in their possession. They may also 
be the most vulnerable due to the fact that their primary 
interest and experience are in transporting commodities. 
Thus, those that handle and transport RAM need special 
training and preparation in this area. 
The principal carriers have prepared themselves and their 
employees, particularly drivers, through use of educational 
materials and available training. Examples of educational 
materials can be found in publications such as "Radioactive 
Materials Transportation Manual" (TS78), "Driver Instruction 
Safety Manual" (TS79), "Field Supervisor and Senior Technician 
Training Manual" (Co78), "Hazardous Materials - Acceptance and 
Handling" (Ea77), and "Restricted Articles Handling" (De77). 
The first two publications are those of Tri-State Motor 
Transit Company which specializes in transport of RAM by 
highway. It possibly is the largest RAM carrier. These 
manuals contain relevant background information, training 
materials, and emergency response procedures. 
Co78 is a training manual published by Chem-Nuclear 
Systems, Inc., for its employees. This multi-purpose company 
is a carrier, shipper, and operator of one of the three 
operational shallow land burial sites for low-level 
radioactive waste in the U.S. (CN78, CN80). The other 
publications, Ea77 and De77, are those by Eastern Air Lines 
and Delta Air Lines, respectively. These latter two 
instructional materials are not as extensive as the others but 
serve as guidance for the company's employees. These latter 
carriers tend to augment their staffs by use of reputable 
consultants as the situation warrants. 
Little information was provided by railroads in the area 
of general background material and employee training to cope 
with transport and accidents involving RAM. Most indicated a 
general posture of depending on consultants, employed as 
needed, or on federal agencies that have responsibilities for 
emergency response to transportation accidents. 
Thus, the expertise available from carriers to cope with 
transportation accidents involving RAM is uneven. It varies 
from the well prepared, in terms of trained personnel, know-
how, equipment and supplies, to those with apparently little 
interest, capability, or ability. 
To obtain and maintain proficiency in controlling 
problems encountered in the transport of RAM it is necessary 
to train the appropriate individuals periodically and 
systematically. The larger companies tend to train their own 
employees whereas the smaller ones utilize available training 
programs. 	Programs available in 1980 were catalogued by 
Thompson (Th80). 	This listing covers training sponsored by 
federal agencies, federal contractors, private companies, and 
academic institutions. 
Impetus for adequate training comes from regulatory 
requirements. The requirements of the Department of Transpor-
tation for driver training were outlined in amendments 
published in the Federal Register on January 13, 1981, (D081) 
entitled "Radioactive Materials; Routing and Driver Training 
Requirements." The effective date of these requirements was 
February 1, 1982. 
4.3 Response Capabilities  
Every state in the SSEB region has the capability for 
managing accidents and incidents associated with RAM 
transportation, as demonstrated in their responses to such 
situations over the years and described in the radiological 
emergency response plans. The current status of these 
capabilities and needs for improving them were discussed in 
detail at two workshops held by SSEB in 1980 and 1981 (SS80, 
SS81). Participants identified some of the improvements 
resulting from recent developments, significant differences 
from the responses for fixed facilities which are being given 
priority consideration, and items for which relatively modest 
efforts could yield important benefits. 
Response planning for RAM transportation emergencies has 
been strengthened considerably by the mandated development of 
state TRERP's; by regulations in several states that require 
shippers of large RAM amounts to notify state agencies of 
amounts, routes, and schedule; and by studies of RAM transpor-
tation supported by DOT and NRC in several states (Ca79, Ca81, 
Ca81a, KY80, SC80) and ongoing in South Carolina, Kentucky, 
and Florida in the SSEB Region. The plan provides a 
systematic program in each state for responding and for 
developing and improving this capability. Notification of RAM 
shipments will, for the first time, inform the state on a 
regular basis how much RAM of the specified large amount is 
being shipped, where the radioactive materials are being 
carried, and who is carrying them. The studies of RAM 
shipments examine compliance with packaging, labelling and 
shipping regulations --the main technique for preventing 
incidents -- and have recommended improvements where needed. 
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Staff members of state agencies responsible for dealing 
with RAM transportation emergencies in the SSEB region confirm 
the observations based on national reports to DOT (Mc80) that 
few incidents occur in any year, and that by far the greatest 
number of responses are to minor incidents. Many 
notifications are false alarms, and most of the others are 
cases of damage to packages or containers without elevated 
radiation exposures or release of radioactivity. The 
incidences of elevated radiation or radionuclide levels have 
been of the order of one per year or less for individual 
states. Most of the states do not appear to have experienced 
a RAM transportation accident that called for major response 
efforts, and elevated levels were not found where such 
responses were needed. 
Effective response to these minor incidents that are the 
most common of RAM transportation emergency situations 
requires prompt notification by the shipper's employee of the 
designated state agency and prompt response by agency 
personnel competent in radiological protection. The driver or 
handler must be alert for elevated radiation or radionuclide 
levels due to damages or imperfections, immediately isolate 
the problem container, and contact the indicated response 
group in the state. The responder must be able to reach the 
site within a few hours, measure reliably the radiation and 
radionuclide levels due to natural background, undamaged RAM, 
and the problem container, and reach a decision concerning the 
extent of the problem. Hence, the shipper's employees need at 
least a brief training course, a simple guide such as the ones 
issued by several states and DOT, and the correct telephone 
number for the state agency. The state agency needs either 
trained staff throughout the state or rapid transportation for 
centrally located professionals, with sufficient monitoring 
instruments in good working order and accessible laboratory 
support to provide the data for decision making. 
Workshop participants emphasized the desirability of 
frequent training courses within each state for local response 
personnel and an improved distribution system for brief guides 
to assure that they are placed in the hands of RAM drivers and 
initial responders to accidents. Difficulties on the part of 
shipper's employees in notifying the appropriate agency 
personnel due to changes in staff, assignments, and telephone 
numbers were reported. Maintenance of radiation detection 
equipment kept at locations throughout the state out of the 
control of radiation protection staff is difficult, as 
indicated in a national survey (M180). Poor maintenance or 
incompetent use of such instruments have been known to cause 
interference with shipments, blocking traffic, and generating 
fear. 
Although their incidence is rare, a state agency needs to 
prepare for serious cases of radionuclide contamination or 
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elevated radiation resulting from transportation accidents. 
In states that have nuclear power plants, the field exercises 
and associated planning for controlling accidents at fixed 
sites are also useful preparation for transportation 
accidents. Two drawbacks were noted concerning the results of 
such exercises: 
1. The Protective Action Guides developed by EPA are 
woefully incomplete because they pertain to only two of many 
potential circumstances. 
2. The critiques following field exercises are not 
adequate for improving the state program. 
A few training exercises have been held to practice for 
transportation accidents, for example by TVA for radioactive 
waste shipments by truck. Among important differences between 
transporation accidents and those fixed facilities is the 
former has the potential for mixed hazardous materials 
shipments and could occur almost anywhere. These possibili-
ties require much broader and more wide-spread preparations 
for early responders such as law enforcement officers and 
firefighters, and in support facilities such as hospitals. It 
was noted, for example, that difficulties have been 
encountered in gaining admission for the injured to emergency 
wards if the extent of their radioactive contamination was in 
question. 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite 	the 	extensive 	transport 	of 	radioactive 
materials, accidents and incidents are rare. During the past 
ten years, total reported accidents plus incidents averaged 65 
per year in the U.S. of which one-sixth resulted in 
radionuclide releases. The primary means of preventing 
incidents of releases and minimizing the effects of accidents 
in causing releases is regulatory control by DOT to assure 
appropriate packaging, labelling, and handling of radioactive 
materials. 
Considerable efforts have been devoted recently to 
reducing the potential for hazard even further by strengthen-
ing the emergency response capabilities of the states. These 
efforts include preparation of state transportation radiation 
emergency response plans; supporting the response capability 
with equipment and supplies, training courses and manuals, and 
response teams from federal agencies and neighboring states 
under joint cooperative programs; and limiting transport 
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routes while requiring shippers to notify state agencies 
concerning major shipments. 
This examination of the status of transportation 
radiation emergency response in the SSEB region of sixteen 
states has found response planning and capability in each 
state. Both differ widely among states in format and extent, 
according to the published plans and discussions held in two 
workshops. 
The following recommendations are based on the available 
information and on suggestions made by participants in the two 
workshops: 
1. A state transportation radiation emergency response 
plan is desirable for planning an effective program and 
coordinating efforts by contributing agencies within a state. 
A model plan should be developed to assist states that have 
only a general disaster plan or radiation emergency plan. 
2. The Southeastern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan is 
the only formal mechanism for mutual support in this type of 
emergency for most states in the region. A detailed program 
for cooperative training, exercises, and responses by 
neighboring states should be developed so that the plan can be 
translated into practical cooperation and support. 
3. Broadly accepted Protective Action Guides are 
required for making decisions during and after an emergency. 
Additional PAG's should be developed beyond the two now 
recommended by EPA for considering external radiation during 
rescue and cleanup, consumption of contaminated food and 
water, surface contamination, and external radiation from 
materials after decontamination. 
4. A comprehensive medical protocol is required to gain 
prompt admission to hospitals for persons who have been 
involved in transportation accidents. 	This is needed to 
prevent delay due to the question of radioactive contamination 
when such contamination is trivial or absent, while preventing 
unacceptable contamination levels in medical facilities. 
5. Frequent radiological training courses on an 
elementary level are needed within each state to maintain the 
competence of first responders despite rapid personnel 
turnover. 
6. The system for distributing information and guidance 
for handling radiation accidents and incidents should be 
improved to assure that telephone numbers and other relevant 
information for notification are current and that potentially 
involved persons have instruction manuals. 
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7. Several options are available to states for assuring 
prompt response to emergencies. For example, responsibility 
and supporting equipment may be centralized or at a local 
level. If centralized, fast transportation and a good field 
communication system must be available; if localized, more 
detailed training and good equipment maintenance must be 
undertaken. 	Such options and their implications should be 
explored to assist state agencies in making choices for 
response. 
8. A systematic effort needs to be made to identify, 
locate, inventory, and evaluate technical support available in 
the private sector which could be used in case of serious 
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7.0 APPENDIX 
Information for states' Transportation Radiation Emergency 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Alabama Civil Defense Act, E.O. #14 dated June 19, 1971. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
Health Department and Civil Defense Department have primary 
responsibilities. Other responsible agencies are the 
Departments of Agriculture and Industries, Public Safety, 
Pensions and Security, the State Highway Department, 
Alabama National Guard, and the Department of Conservation. 
Detailed account of responsibilities appears on pages 9-10 
of the plan. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
Individuals are listed on pages B-11 through B-14. 	No 
qualifications are given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
Procedure for notification in Appendix B-1 of plan. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
The State Health Officer or the Governors Office shall 
release necessary information to the public through various 
news media. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
Contact Georgia and Florida in the event of a power plant 
incident. Page B-3a gives details. 
7. Availability of training (r, v'ganizations). 
Training is outlined on page B-2 and Appendix VIII. State 
Department of Health and Nuclear Facility operators give 
separate seminars at least annually. 
8. Available training manuals. 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Arkansas Emergency Services Act 511 of 1973, Act of 8 of 
1961 (State Control Act), Governors Directive "Emergency 
Assignments and Procedures." 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
Local governments have the major responsibility. If their 
resources are inadequate they contact state government's 
Office of Emergency Services. Responsibilities are 
assigned as appropriate to a given situation. Pages Q6-Q8 
list responsibilities in detail. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
No names or qualifications are given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
Procedure for notification appears on pages 12-13. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
Radiological Response Team Captain. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
None mentioned. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
Short course given on "Management of Radiation Accidents", 
then refresher courses are given. Also, technical training 
is given to response teams, including a simulated incident 
at least once every 5 years. Chapter 8 in the plan gives a 
detailed description of training. 
8. Available training manuals. 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Chapter 252 Florida Statutes and Governor's Executive Order 
76-6. 
2 Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is the 
lead agency. The Division of Disaster Preparedness, the 
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, the High-
way Patrol and local state agencies all have supportive 
roles. Responsibilities are specified on pages 2-3. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
No names or qualifications were given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the re-
lated agencies. 
Communications for informing related agencies and their 
personnel are as given on pages 3-5. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
Control of official release to the news media of all infor-
mation from a state agency will be exercised by the 
Governor or his designated representative. Responsibility 
of media releases to determine validity of information and 
accuracy of technical data rests with the Department of 
Health and Rehabilitative Services, Central Operation 
Services. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
None mentioned. 
• 7. Availability of training (organizations). 
None mentioned. 
8. Available training manuals. 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Civil Defense Act of 1951, Governor's E.O. February 8, 
1978, Governor's E.O. April 5, 1979, Georgia Natural 
Disaster Operations Plans, Radiation Control Act, Water 
Quality Control Act of 1974, Air Quality Control Act of 
1978, Transportation of Hazardous Materials Act of 1979. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities, title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
a) Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental 
Protection Division -- see page 10 for responsibili-
ties. 
b) Georgia Department of Defense (Civil Defense Division) 
--see page 10 for responsibilities. 
c) Georgia Department of Public Safety -- see page 11 for 
responsibilities. 
d) Georgia Department of Transportation -- see page 12 for 
responsibilities. 
e) Georgia Department of Agriculture -- see page 12 for 
responsibilities. 
f) Georgia Department of Human Resources -- see page 12 
for responsibilities. 
g) Georgia Game and Fish Division -- see page 13 for 
responsibilities. 
h) Georgia Forestry Commission -- see pages 13-14 for 
responsibilities. 
i) Georgia Local Agencies -- see pages 13-14 for responsi-
bilities. 
• 3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
See pages 5-8 for listings of individuals -- qualifications 
are not mentioned. 
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4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
Prodedure for notification appears on pages 1-2. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
The local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will keep 
public informed through the information officer as designa-
ted by the State Emergency Coordinator. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
State Radiological Program Directors of states that may be 
affected are to be notified as soon as practical following 
a radiological emergency. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
Environmental 	Protection Division presents periodic 
lectures, training, and exercises -- see page 18 for 
details. 
8. Available training manuals. 




1. Enabling legislation and regultions. 
Enabling legislation and regulations are not mentioned 
within Annex Q. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
lisitng). 
Local government, in coordination with appropriate state 
and/or federal officials, will respond to an incident. If 
local authorities are unable to cope with the incident the 
state Division of Disaster and Emergency Services is 
responsible. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
Hazardous Materials Response Team Members are listed in 
Appendix Q - 3, pages Q-3-1, Q-3-2. No qualifications are 
given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
If more than two state agencies are involved in a hazardous 
materials accident situation, the Division of Disaster and 
Emergency Services must be notified. The Disaster and 
Emergency Services Official notifies the Radiation Control 
Branch first, then the Kentucky State Police, State Fire 
Marshall, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, 
Department of Transportation, Division of Explosives and 
Blasting, Department of Agriculture, and Department of 
Human Resources. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
All public information activities and releases will be 
coordinated by the Disaster and Emergency Services 
Coordinator at the incident scene. All state agencies will 
refer media inquiries to the Disaster and Emergency 
Services Coordinator at the incident scene or to the Public 
Inormation Officer at the Emergency Operations Center. 
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6. Interstate agreements. 
Interstate agreements were not mentioned. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
Training was not mentioned. 
8. Available training manuals. 
No manual was cited. 
Appendix A-6 
• LOUISIANA 
1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
The Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974 (Act No. 636, Chapter 6) 
and the Louisiana Civil Defense Law of 1950 (Act No. 38 as 
amended). 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
The Nuclear Energy Division has the overall responsibility 
for the administration, implementation, application and 
coordination of radiological emergency procedures in the 
event of a radiological incident. Other agencies and their 
responsibilities are given on pages 2-3 and in Appendices 
III and IV. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
Names were given on pages 36-40. No qualifications were 
given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the rel-
ated agencies. 
The Nuclear Energy Division begins the notification 
procedure. They notify other state agencies as appropri-
ate. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
Public information is to be provided by the Nuclear Energy 
Divison. The Administrator (Team Captain) is responsible 
for notification of the public through various news media 
and to provide an evaluation of the incident in terms of 
public health. Also see Appendix VII. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
No interstate agreements were mentioned. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
The Nuclear Energy Division will conduct a training program 
as specified in Appendix VIII on page 26. 
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8. Available training manuals. 
No manual was cited. 
Appendix A-7 
MARYLAND 
1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Civil Defense and Disaster Preparedness Act, Article 15 of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland and Article 43 Section 680 
of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
County governments are responsible for any radiological 
emergency until their resources are exhausted, inadequate 
or unavailable to mitigate an emergency. At this point, 
they contact the state government agencies through the 
Department of Civil Defense and Disaster Preparedness. 
Specific agencies and their responsibilities are given on 
pages Q-4-1 through Q-4-3. See also Tables Q-5-2 and Q- 5- 
3. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
No names or qualifications were given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
See Figure Q- 5 - 3 and Table Q - 5 - 1. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
The state and counties coordinate efforts with fixed 
nuclear facilities to develop a public information program 
as covered on pages Q-5-2 through Q - 5 -5. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
Maryland is currently formalizing mutual aid compacts with 
contiguous states. A mutual aid agreement exists between 
Maryland and the District of Columbia. 
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7. Availability of training (organizations). 
The Maryland Civil Defense and Disaster Preparedness Agency 
is responsible for the overall development of exercise and 
drill scenarios and for training programs. Section 6 of 
the Plan -- Plan Testing and Maintenance, pages Q-6-1 
through Q-6-3 gives details. 
8. Available training manuals. 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
No information available. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
No information available. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
No information available. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
No information available. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
No information available. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
No information available. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
No information available. 
8. Available training manuals. 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Executive Order 79-19. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
The Disaster Planning and Operators Office, Office of the 
Adjutant General, shall be the coordinating agency for 
response to emergencies involving radiation. Their 
responsibilities and the responsibilities of other state 
agencies as designated appropriate to the incident are 
given on pages 4 -8. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
Listing of qualified personnel is given in Appendices A-1 
through H -6. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
Initial notification of a radiological incident is made to 
Disaster Planning and Operations, Office of the Adjutant 
General. They in turn contact the Nuclear Emergency Team 
Coordinator who with local officials would continue the 
notification. This continuation is not explicitly stated. 
Page 8 covers the procedure. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
Statements of immediate interest should be made through 
local authorities with technical guidance from the Missouri 
Nuclear Emergency Team leader. State level news releases 
will be made through the Governor's office or the Depart-
ment of Public Safety. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
No interstate agreements were mentioned. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
Training was not mentioned. 
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Appendix A-9 (continued) 
8. Available training manuals. 
No manual was cited. 
Appendix A-10 
NORTH CAROLINA 
1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
These are in Chapter 62-2 and Chapter 104E. An extensive 
listing is given in Annex A, page 1 - Authorities and 
References. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
The Department of Crime Control and Public Safety is 
responsible for allocating state resources and directing 
personnel and functions of other departments as required. 
See pages 3-14 for agencies and their specific responsibil-
ities. See also Annex C, page 1 for an Organization Chart. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
No names or qualifications were given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
The Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, Division 
of Emergency Management has primary responsibility for 
notification procedures to such agencies as are required to 
cope with the incident. Federal government agencies as 
needed will be contacted.See Annex H, page 1 for communi-
cations methods. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
Local government is responsible for public information 
until such time as the State Emergency Response Team 
assumes responsibility. For hazardous substances spills, 
the Department of Natural Resources and Community Develop-
ment is responsible for spill information prior to acti-
vation of the State Emergency Response Team. 
• 6. Interstate agreements. 
As provided by agreement through the Southern Mutual 
Radiation Assistance Plan, other states in accordance with 
the situation will be contacted. See pages 14-15 for 
details. 
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Appendix A-10 (continued) 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
The Division of Emergency Management has primary 
responsibility for training program as given on pages 18-
19. 
8. Available training manuals. 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Governor's E.O. in 1958 and House Bill #512 of 1967. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
Under control of the Director of Occupational and 
Radiological Health Services, Department of Health. Also 
involved are Oklahoma Civil Defense and Department of 
Public Safety. Page 7 in the Health Annex and pages 1-4 in 
internal plan give responsibilities in detail. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
Listing of 1976 County Medical Society Officers is given in 
Appendix 10 to Health Annex-Natural Disaster Plan. No 
qualifications for radiological emergencies are given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
When an emergency occurs, the Oklahoma Civil Defense and 
Occupational and Radiological Health Service must be 
notified as listed on page 9 of the Health Annex. 
Communications are directed by the Occupational and 
Radiological Health Service once they have been notified. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
No public information spokesperson was mentioned. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
If the emergency involves a very large-scale spread of 
radioactive materials, the possibility exists that the 
Occupational and Radiological Health Services may 
recommend that the Governor request radiation control 
personnel from surrounding states through the Southern 
Mutual Radiological Assistance Plan (SMRAP). Page 3 
-internal plan. 
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Appendix A-11 (continued) 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
Training was not mentioned. 
8. Available training manuals. 
No manual was cited. 
Appendix A-12 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Act No. 223 of 1967 of the General Assembly of the State of 
South Carolina and subsequent amendments to the Act. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
The Bureau of Radiological Health of the Department of 
Health and Environmental Control has primary responsibil-
ity. The Emergency Preparedness Division of the Adjutant 
General's Office has primary operational control. State 
agencies and their responsibilities are given on pages 11- 
21. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
List of names is given on pages A5 through A6. 	No 
qualifications are given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
Emergency notification is begun by the Bureau of 
Radiological Health and continued as given in Annex A -
Alert and Notification. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
The Governor's Press Secretary or authorized representa-
tive will direct and control the Public Information Service 
Response Groups activities and serve as the official 
spokesperson regarding the preparation and release of 
emergency information by state government. See Annex C --
Public Information. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
There is an information exchange agreement between South 
Carolina and Georgia, see page 74, Table 7.2. and a similar 
agreement between North Carolina and South Carolina, see 
page 73, Table 7.1. The Southern Mutual Radiation 
Assistance Plan is in force. 
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Appendix A-12 (continued) 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
Periodic training sessions will be coordinated by the DHE 
and EPD as given in Annex B -- Training and Annex D --
Exercise and Drills. 
8. Available training manuals. 
Included within this plan is the "Technical Radiological 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
1) Public Law 93-288, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. 
2) Public Law 91-606, The Disaster Relief Act of 1970, 
Sections 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 301, 302, 303 
and 304. 
3) Part 2205, Title 24, FDAA, Code of Federal Regulations, 
May 1975. 
4) Governor's E.O. No. 18, July 31, 1975. 
5) Volume 3, Title 7, Chapter 5, Section 7-601 through 7-
630, Tennessee Code Annotated. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
The Tennessee Department of Public Health has the overall 
responsibility. It utilizes as necessary the assistance of 
federal, state, and local agencies. See pages 7a-d, 9, 36-
39, 47 -85 for agencies and responsibilities. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
Listings are given on pages 8a-d, 41a, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 
71, 77, 80, 82, 84 and 85. No qualifications are 
mentioned. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
The Tennessee Office of Civil Defense and Emergency 
Preparedness on receiving notification from the Department 
of Health contacts the necessary state agencies. The 
notification procedure appears on page 41. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
The Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Public Health, or 
the Governor's Office shall release necessary information 
to the public through various news media. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
Southern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan as given on pages 
18-20. 
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Aprendix A-13 (continued) 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
The Department of Public Health in cooperation with the 
Office of Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness will 
conduct seminars, exercises or other forms of training from 
time to time to acquaint personnel with the provisions of 
their plan and expected responses to certain emergencies. 
Training will occur at least annually. 
8. Available training manuals. 




1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Section 21.403, Texas Regulations for Control of Radiation. 
The Radiation Control Act, Article 459 of Revised Civil 
Statutes. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
The Department of Health, Division of Occupational Health 
and Radiation Control has primary responsibilities given on 
pages 6-8. It activates the Disaster Emergency Services 
Council when necessary. Through the Council, other Texas 
state agencies are requested to provide emergency resposes 
outlined in their respective Annex of the EOP. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
No names or qualifications are given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
The Radiation Control Branch (RCB) is the primary 
notification agency. Other agencies are notified at the 
discretion of the RCB either directly or through the 
Disaster Emergency Services Council. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
The Radiation Control Branch Director is responsible for 
public information. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
No interstate agreements were mentioned. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
The Department of Health, Division of Occupational Health 
and Radiation Control has the responsibility for training 
staff. Details of training are not given. 
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Appendix A-14 (continued) 
8. Available training manuals. 
No manual was cited. 
Appendix A-15 
VIRGINIA 
1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
Governor's E.O. number 42(80) of June 9, 1970 and Title 44, 
Chapter 3.3, Section 44-146.30 of Authority I.A. 1. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
Local government officials of the political jurisdiction in 
which the accident occurs are responsible for the overall 
response as it affects the general public. Technical 
guidance and assistance in the radiological aspects will be 
provided by the State Department of Health. The overall 
state response will be coordinated by the State Office of 
Emergency and Energy Services. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
No names or qualifications are given. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
Local government would be notified first and would notify 
other agencies as necessary. See pages 14-2 through 14-3. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
No public information spokesperson was mentioned. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
No interstate agreements were mentioned. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
The State Office of Emergency and Energy Services will 
provide an on-going training program for instructing and 
qualifying state and local personnel to perform necessary 
emergency functions. A detailed plan is given in Appendix 
12. 
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Appendix A-15 (continued) 
8. Available training manuals. 
No manual was cited. 
Appendix A-16 
WEST VIRGINIA 
1. Enabling legislation and regulations. 
West Virginia Code, Chapter 15, Article 5, as amended. 
2. Participating agencies and their responsibilities; title 
to each administrator, (or pages in plan that have a title 
listing). 
The primary responsibility differs as to the task. 	The 
Department of Health has primary responsbility for 
Emergency Health Services. Task assignments to various 
state agencies are given on page A-1. 
3. List of qualified individuals (or pages in plan which 
list). 
No names or qualifications were mentioned. 
4. Communications for sounding the alarm, informing the 
related agencies. 
The Department of Emergency Services has the primary 
responsibility for communications as given in Annex C and 
Appendix 1 to Annex c. 
5. Public information spokesperson. 
The Governor's Press Office has primary responsibility for 
public information as given in Annex P. 
6. Interstate agreements. 
No interstate agreements were mentioned. 
7. Availability of training (organizations). 
Training was not mentioned. 
8. Available training manuals. 
No manual was cited. 
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